PENNZOIL V. TEXACO, TWENTY YEARS AFTER:
LESSONS FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS
ROBERT M. LLOYD∗
Introduction
On November 19, 1985, a state court jury in Houston, Texas returned a verdict
against Texaco, Inc., in the amount of 10.53 billion dollars plus prejudgment
interest.1 This was the largest civil verdict in history,2 and it arose not out of a mass
disaster but from a business deal and the judgment calls lawyers made in the course
of that deal. As we approach the twentieth anniversary of the verdict, it is a good
time to look back at the case and see what lessons business lawyers can learn from
the case and from the deal that gave rise to the case.
The first part of this article is an account of the transaction and the resulting
lawsuit, selectively taken from the many published accounts.3 The second part of the
article explains some of the lessons a lawyer can learn from Pennzoil v. Texaco—from
what the people involved did wrong and, in some cases, from what they did right.
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I. The Deal and the Lawsuit
Getty Oil was founded by J. Paul Getty, a colorful figure even for the oil
business. J. Paul was the son of one of the early wildcatters,4 and he had taken the
measly few million dollars his father had given him5 and multiplied it hundreds of
times, becoming one of the first billionaires.6 In the late 1950s, Fortune magazine
described him as the richest person in America.7 By all accounts, J. Paul was an
unpleasant person with an ego as big as his bank balance.8 He was famous for
saying: “The meek shall inherit the earth, but not its mineral rights.”9 According to
one writer, it was the only joke he ever made.10
One of the meek did inherit some serious mineral rights, however. J. Paul had
four sons, and three of them self-destructed, largely from the stress of being the sons
of J. Paul.11 This and some other bizarre circumstances left Gordon Getty, the son
least like the old man, in charge of the family fortune. One son, Ronald, whom J.
Paul had disinherited because his mother had won such a good settlement when she
divorced J. Paul, had worked for Getty Oil.12 But after Ronald made some errors in

4 Getty’s father had been the general counsel for an insurance company until, at age 45, he went to
Oklahoma to collect a debt for his employer and succumbed to the oil fever. ROBERT LENZNER,
THE GREAT GETTY 9-10 (1985).

Getty’s father left him $500,000 in his will, but there had been earlier gifts of stock and money that
had been substantial. See id. at 34.
5

6

See id. at 220.

7

Id. at 92, 120.

8 See id. passim. He achieved considerable notoriety when he installed a pay phone in his English estate
to keep his guests from running up the estate’s telephone bill. Margot Pitkin, Oil Billionaire Kept Harem
of Beauties: Getty Fuelled by Lust, Greed and Stinginess, DAILY TEL. MIRROR, Dec. 13, 1995.
9

Euan Ferguson, Big Money Given With Good Grace, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Aug. 14, 1994.

10

Id.

See LENZNER, supra note 4, at 144-149. The former president of one of Getty’s companies, who
had had all four of the sons working for him at various times, put it bluntly: “Paul browbeat them to
death.” Id. at 144.
11

COLL, supra note 3, at 21; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 25, 54. One of J. Paul’s biographers claims
that Ronald was not provided for because J. Paul thought he would inherit considerable wealth from
his maternal grandfather. LENZNER, supra note 4, at 76-77. In any event, Ronald’s exclusion from the
12
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judgment, his oldest brother George convinced the old man to fire him.13 Another
son, Eugene Paul, who later changed his name to J. Paul Getty, Jr., also started out in
the family firm, but he too ran into problems and was fired by his father.14 He joined
an international jet set that included Mick Jagger, but he overdid the wild life and
became a hopeless drug addict.15
George, the oldest son and a very able businessman, worked his way up to the
number two spot in the company behind his father.16 But the stress of dealing with
his father’s constant badgering became too much for him, and he committed suicide
at the age of 43.17 This left Gordon, who had never shown any aptitude for business.
A self-described “absent-minded professor,”18 Gordon had been forced to leave
Getty Oil (again at George’s insistence) after a series of unfortunate incidents, some
of them involving his failure to remember what he had done with company cars.19
Thereafter, Gordon devoted himself to composing music in the soundproof music
room he had built in his 25-room San Francisco mansion.20

trust resulted in several lawsuits. Id. at 77. J. Paul’s mother left Ronald $200,000 in her will as partial
compensation for the way J. Paul had treated him. Id. at 79, 148.
PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 58. After several unsuccessful attempts to start his own business,
Ronald began suing his brothers and others who had received portions of the family fortune.
Eventually, he was able to obtain a settlement which gave him close to $10 million. COLL, supra note
3, at 23-24.

13

14

COLL, supra note 3, at 96.

15 See LENZNER, supra note 4, at 159; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 58-59. Eugene Paul’s life got off to
a bad start. He was born three months before his parents married. LENZNER, supra note 4 at 42.
When J. Paul finally married Eugene Paul’s mother (his fourth wife), he had not yet received a divorce
from his third wife. Id.

Id. at 161. In addition to being executive vice-president of Getty Oil, George was a director of
Bank of America, a director of Douglas Aircraft—one of the nation’s largest aircraft manufacturers—
and a chief fundraiser for the Los Angeles Philharmonic. Id.

16

17

See id. at 161-67.

18

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 75.

19

Id. at 33-34.

20

See COLL, supra note 3, at 20.
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Gordon’s power stemmed from a deal his grandmother had struck. In actuality,
J. Paul hadn’t been as rich as he claimed to be. Early in his career, he had attempted
to take over a large oil company, Tidewater Oil. For this project, he needed the
financial support of his mother, who had inherited most of her husband’s wealth.21
J. Paul’s mother was afraid her driven son would blow the family fortune in his
wheeling and dealing, so she balked at loaning him the money for the venture. She
ultimately relented, but only on the condition that J. Paul put most of the family
fortune (his as well as hers) into a trust.22 She set up the trust so that upon its
termination all of the trust assets would be distributed to J. Paul’s grandchildren or
their descendants. In the meantime, only the income from the trust assets would be
available to the family members.23 This meant that most of the billion dollars J. Paul
made during his career was beyond his control. He couldn’t spend it. All he could
do was to spend the income it earned.
Before J. Paul died, he amended the trust so that upon his death the trust would
be managed by three trustees: Gordon, whom J. Paul then considered the leastincompetent of his surviving children; Lansing Hays, J. Paul’s longtime lawyer and
right-hand man; and Security Pacific National Bank, then the second-largest bank in
California.24 But when J. Paul died, the bank refused to serve, passing up a $3
million a year fee for fear of the potential liability. The trust was so big that a
judgment against the bank for mismanaging it could destroy the bank.25 This meant
that when Hays died, Gordon was left in sole charge of the trust, which owned 40%
of the stock of Getty Oil Company.
Twelve percent of the stock of Getty Oil Company, that part of his fortune that
J. Paul had been able to keep out of the trust, belonged to the J. Paul Getty Museum

21 Most of George Getty’s $10 million dollar estate went to his wife Sarah, J. Paul’s mother.
LENZNER, supra note 4, at 34.

See LENZNER, supra note 4, at 49. Among other things, the trust prohibited the trustee (J. Paul)
from investing the trust’s money in any oil companies in which the trust did not already own an
interest. See COLL, supra note 3, at 15-16.

22

23

See LENZNER, supra note 4, at 50-51.

See COLL, supra note 3, at 16; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 82. One writer says it was George’s death
that led J. Paul to amend the trust in this way. COLL, supra note 3, at 16.
24

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 82-83; see also COLL, supra note 3, at 17 (describing efforts to persuade
Security Pacific to accept appointment).
25
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of Malibu, California. Like many rich people, J. Paul had become an art collector,26
and in his later life he decided to build a monument to himself at the taxpayers’
expense.27 (The museum qualified as a charitable foundation, making Getty’s gift to
it exempt from estate tax. If he had not left it to charity, most of his estate would
have gone to the feds in estate tax.). J. Paul started the project before he died,
commissioning the building of what one writer called “a garish $17 million
monstrosity full of proto-Classical geegaws.”28 Most of J. Paul’s estate went to the
museum, making it the richest museum in the world. At the time the estate was
probated, the museum’s inheritance was worth $1.2 billion.29 (When the museum’s
stock was sold to Texaco, Inc. in the transaction described below, the museum
became the second-wealthiest charitable organization in the world, behind only the
Ford Foundation.)30
When Gordon became the sole trustee of his family’s trust, he didn’t want to be
involved in the day-to-day management of Getty Oil.31 But as he observed the
company, and in particular the price of its stock, he came to the conclusion that the
people who were running the company weren’t doing a very good job.32 Gordon
was not just concerned about the effect of this mismanagement on his own wealth;
he also felt a responsibility to the other beneficiaries of the trust. So he started
looking for ways to increase the market price of the company’s stock, which was

26 In his typical fashion, he had begun his collection by finding bargains, buying at depressed prices in
the 1930s. Even then, he had chosen to concentrate on the types of works that most collectors
overlooked, which enabled him to pick them up at still lower prices. LENZNER, supra note 4, at 59-60.
27 Getty’s personal assistant described his motivation: “He wanted to make sure his name would be
perpetuated as long as there was civilization.” Norris Bramlett, quoted in LENZNER, supra note 4, at 4.

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 88. It was said that the museum was designed like a Roman palace to
indulge J. Paul’s belief that he was a reincarnation of Hadrian. Ferguson, supra note 9.

28

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 88. Under federal tax laws, the Getty Museum was required to spend
almost $54 million dollars a year. This was more than nine times the acquisition budget of England’s
National Gallery, and it had the effect of driving up art prices throughout the world. RUSSELL
MILLER, THE HOUSE OF GETTY 315 (1985).
29

30

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 268.

31

COLL, supra note 3, at 37-38.

BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: THE BATTLE
CORPORATIONS 190 (1998).
32
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then trading at a price far below the value of the company’s oil reserves.33 Although
Gordon was a member of the Getty Oil board of directors, other members of
management didn’t take him seriously, seeing him merely as the Old Man’s eccentric
son. So Gordon began looking for ways to protect the trust that would not require
the cooperation of Getty Oil management.34
Gordon consulted Texas oil barons and Wall Street investment bankers,
soliciting ideas for increasing the Getty Oil stock price.35 Pretty soon the word got
around that there was internal trouble at Getty Oil.36 This caught the attention of
Hugh Liedtke, the Chairman of Pennzoil Company. Liedtke had always wanted to
become a major player in the oil business, but to achieve that goal, he needed much
larger oil reserves (“oil in the ground” as they called it in the business).37 Getty Oil
had those reserves.38 Liedtke calculated that buying Getty Oil was the cheapest way
to get the reserves he needed—far better than sending out expensive exploration
parties, which might just come up with dry holes. This was ironic in two ways. The
idea of buying oil companies to get their reserves (known as “drilling for oil on Wall
Street”) had been pioneered by J. Paul Getty, and it was his need for his mother’s
money to do it that had led to the creation of the trust that Gordon now
controlled.39
Seeing that the stock of Getty Oil was split among the trust, which owned 40%,
the museum, which owned 12%, and the public, which owned the remaining 48%,
Liedtke (acting on behalf of Pennzoil) made a tender offer to buy 20% of the
company’s stock at a price of $100 a share.40
33

See COLL, supra note 3, at 40-56; WASSERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 190.

See COLL, supra note 3, at 56-66; ARTHUR L. LIMAN, LAWYER: A LIFE
CONTROVERSY 240 (1998).
34

35

See COLL, supra note 3, at 43-49.

36

See id. at 101-18.

37

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 44.

OF

COUNSEL

AND

Getty Oil’s reserves were especially attractive because two-thirds of them were located in the United
States, rather than in potentially unstable third world countries. COLL, supra note 3, at 42.

38

39

See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.

40

COLL, supra note 3, at 252-57; WASSERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 190.
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Acquiring 20% of the stock would allow Liedtke to team up with Gordon and
throw out the current Getty Oil management.41 Because the company’s stock had
been selling for $80 a share before the tender offer42 (it had been selling for $50 a
share before Gordon got involved in trying to raise the stock price)43, it seemed sure
that Liedtke would get his 20%.44
Gordon, however, thought he could do better. He and his advisors came up
with a plan whereby Pennzoil and the trust would together buy all of the Getty oil
shares in the hands of the public and the museum, with the trust ultimately owning
four-sevenths of the total shares and Pennzoil owning three-sevenths.45 Gordon
proposed the deal to Liedtke and Liedtke agreed to it. Gordon would be chairman
of the company; Liedtke would be chief executive officer and would run the day-today operations. They agreed that they would offer the museum and the public
shareholders $110 a share for their stock.46
Pennzoil’s lawyers drafted a five-page
Memorandum of Agreement spelling out the terms of the deal.47 Gordon Getty
signed it on behalf of the trust and Hugh Liedtke signed it on behalf of Pennzoil.48
Harold Williams, chairman of the museum’s board of trustees, was asked to sign on
behalf of the museum. Williams was being represented in the transaction by Marty
Lipton, one of the nation’s premier corporate lawyers. Before Williams signed the
memorandum, Lipton added language stating that the museum’s participation was
subject to the approval of the transaction by the Getty Oil board of directors.
Lipton’s handwritten insert said: “[U]pon condition that if not approved at the Jan. 2
board meeting . . . the museum will not be bound in any way by this plan and will

41

See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 190-91.

42

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 149.

43

Id. at 178.

44

COLL, supra note 3, at 257; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 150.

45

COLL, supra note 3, at 266-67; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 158.

46

See COLL, supra note 3, at 267-82; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 160-61.

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 166-67. The full text of the memorandum is reproduced in Roger M.
Baron & Ronald J. Baron, The Pennzoil-Texaco Dispute: An Independent Analysis, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 253,
282-85 (1986).
47

48 See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 785 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) [hereinafter “Texaco
I”].
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have no liability or obligation to anyone hereunder.”49 The memorandum contained
a space for a signature on behalf of Getty Oil, indicating that the board of directors
had approved the deal. However, no one ever signed for Getty Oil.50
To keep Gordon from changing his mind, something he was notorious for
doing, a Pennzoil lawyer drafted a letter for Gordon’s signature. In the letter,
Gordon agreed that if the Getty Oil board of directors did not consent to the
proposed transaction, he would go ahead with it anyway, attempting to get the
museum to join with him in using their combined 52% of the stock to oust the
board of directors.51 Gordon signed the letter, but only after adding language stating
that he would not take action against the board of directors if doing so would violate
his fiduciary obligations.52
The Getty Oil board of directors had scheduled a meeting for the evening of
January 2. At the meeting, Gordon and his advisors (lawyers and investment
bankers) presented their proposal for the tender at $110 a share. They said that the
offer would be good only as long as the board meeting was in session. If the board
adjourned without accepting the offer, the offer would terminate.53 This did not sit
well with the board. The board was indignant that it was being asked to consent to a
deal involving billions of dollars without the time to think about it and study it in
detail. They also thought the price was too low.54
In transactions of this sort, it is customary for the board to hire an investment
banking firm to render a “fairness opinion,” in which the investment banking firm
(supposedly expert in the valuation of companies) tells the board that the company is
not being sold for less than it is worth.55 A major purpose of such opinions is to give
the directors some protection against suits by shareholders alleging that the directors
49

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 169 (emphasis in original).

50

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 191.

51

See Baron & Baron, supra note 47, at 281 (setting forth the letter in full).

52

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 170.

53

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 174.

54

COLL, supra note 3, at 295-96.

See Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Investment Bankers’ Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions, 96 YALE.
L.J. 119, 120 (1986).
55
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violated their duty to the shareholders by failing to get the best price for the
company.56 Many people think these fairness opinions are shams and that the
investment bankers come up with whatever numbers they need in order to let their
clients do the deal.57 But this time the board’s investment banker refused to give a
fairness opinion because he said the price really was too low. (Whether Diogenes
found his man or whether there were other motives involved, I’ll leave for others to
decide.)58 The trustees of the museum, however, were able to get their investment
bankers to opine that the museum would be receiving a fair price if it sold its shares
for $110 each. In any event, the Getty Oil board rejected Gordon’s proposal by a
vote of ten to five.59
The meeting dragged on, with various members of the board proposing other
alternatives for selling the company and Gordon finding reasons to oppose them
all.60 Shortly after 1:30 a.m., one of the directors, Harold Stuart, began to wonder
why Gordon was against all the alternative plans even though many of them would
benefit the trust. Stuart asked Gordon point blank if there was a secret deal with
Pennzoil. Gordon consulted his lawyer, and the lawyer then read the board the letter
containing Gordon’s promise to try to replace the board if they didn’t go along with
the Pennzoil deal.61 The directors were outraged.62 But at 2:30 a.m., after some
acrimonious discussion, the board voted to make a counteroffer, proposing to accept

56

See id. at 123.

57 See, e.g., Giuffra, supra note 55, at 123 (discussing shopping for favorable opinions); Robert A.
Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the “Nancy Reagan Defense”: May Target Boards
“Just Say No”? Should They Be Allowed To? 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 469 (1990).
58 One writer speculates that the banker’s motives may have included, among others, (1) basic
integrity, (2) protecting the reputation of his firm, or (3) killing the deal in order to earn a larger fee on
a sale of the entire company. COLL, supra note 3, at 293.
59 PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 175. As with many other aspects of the transaction, it is not clear what
the facts really were. One writer suggests the actual vote may have been 9-6, depending on how an
ambiguous vote was counted. COLL, supra note 3, at 298.
60

See COLL, supra note 3, at 302-05.

61

See id. at 306.

62

See id. at 306-07.
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the deal Gordon and Liedtke had worked out if the price were increased to $120.
They then adjourned to reconvene at three the next afternoon.63
When Liedtke’s representatives told him of the $120-a-share counteroffer, he
was furious. He had been expecting to make a deal at $110 a share or at most a bit
more.64 To keep the deal from falling apart, Pennzoil’s lawyers and investment
bankers drew up a couple of counteroffers of their own to present at the afternoon
board meeting. But Lipton, the museum’s lawyer, had inserted himself into the deal
in a role akin to that of a mediator, and he assured them the proposals wouldn’t fly.65
Instead, Lipton proposed a deal whereby Getty Oil’s insurance subsidiary would be
sold and any proceeds in excess of $1 billion dollars would be distributed to the
selling shareholders of Getty Oil, who would receive these proceeds in addition to
the $110 in cash. Pennzoil and the trust would guarantee that the selling
shareholders would receive at least $5 per share from the sale of the insurance sub
and that the money would be received within 5 years.66 Arthur Liman, the Pennzoil
lawyer with whom Lipton was dealing, knew that Liedtke was angry because he felt
he was being asked to bid against himself, so Liman refused to convey the
counteroffer to Liedtke until it had been formally approved by the board.67
When the board reconvened in the afternoon, Lipton presented his proposal.
The board’s investment banker still refused to give a fairness opinion, contending
See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 181. The proposal was actually for $110 in cash and a $10
debenture. See Texaco I, 729 S.W.2d at 785.
63

See COLL, supra note 3, at 314; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 183. There had been talk of giving the
selling shareholders some “optics” in addition to the $110 in cash. In the parlance of the trade,
“optics” meant securities that looked good on their faces but had a real value substantially less than
their face value, for instance promissory notes payable in the future that bore no interest or bore
interest at a rate substantially less than the market rate. See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 183. Such
notes would have a market value less than their face value. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A.
BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS 19-28 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining discounting of future
payments).
64

65

See COLL, supra note 3, at 315; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 186-87.

66 See COLL, supra note 3, at 315; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 187. This proposal had originally been
made by Pennzoil with the amount being $3 per share. Lipton told Pennzoil lawyer Arthur Liman
that the proposal would not be acceptable to the Getty Oil board but that he thought it would be
acceptable if the guaranteed amount were increased to $5 per share. See COLL, supra note 3, at 315-16;
PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 187.
67

See COLL, supra note 3, at 316; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 187.
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that the consideration to the selling shareholders, which everyone seems to assume
was the equivalent of a cash payment of between $112.50 and $113.00, was too low.68
But after three hours of discussion, the board voted to accept Lipton’s proposal.69
What happened next was hotly contested. Pennzoil lawyer Arthur Liman had
been waiting outside the room where the board was meeting so that he could convey
the result to Liedtke, who had refused to be in the same building.70 At the trial,
Liman testified that when the meeting adjourned, he came into the room where the
board had been meeting, and a number of the participants congratulated him and
shook his hand, saying things like “Congratulations, Arthur. You’ve got yourself a
deal!”71 No one representing the trust, Getty Oil, or the museum recalled the
congratulations or the handshakes. As one writer put it, “Never . . . would so many
handshakes be remembered only by one-half of the clasp.”72
Later that evening, Liedtke telephoned Gordon at his home. Gordon’s wife
answered the phone and invited Liedtke over to drink some champagne and toast
the deal. Liedtke declined. He had committed himself to a celebration with
members of his entourage.73 But Larry Tisch, a member of the Getty Oil board and
a business titan in his own right,74 did go to Gordon’s suite to toast the deal.75

68See

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 188-89. Assuming monthly compounding, a payment of $5.00 made
five years in the future would have a value of $3.00 if a discount rate of 10% were used and $2.50 if a
discount rate of 14% were used. See HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 64, table 2-2 at 24.
69See

COLL, supra note 3, at 319.

70See

LIMAN, supra note 34, at 242.

71PETZINGER,

supra note 3, at 192; see also COLL, supra note 3, at 321; LIMAN, supra note 34, at 243-44.

72PETZINGER,

supra note 3, at 192. At trial, Pennzoil’s trial counsel argued that the handshakes were
intended to bind the deal, but in his memoirs, Liman says his real interest at that point was getting
into the meeting room to have access to the platters of sandwiches he knew were there. He had not
had a chance to eat while he was waiting to hear of the board’s decision. LIMAN, supra note 34, at
243-44.
73

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 193.

74

See infra note 153.

75

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 327.
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While the businesspeople were celebrating, the lawyers (as usual) went back to
work, hammering out the details and drafting the agreement. The PR people
prepared a press release, but the Getty lawyers refused to allow them to send it out
the media, saying that it mischaracterized the deal. It said that the Getty Oil board
had “voted to accept a plan,” whereas the Getty Oil lawyers contended that the
details of the plan were to be agreed to in the future. Moreover, the press release
said that in addition to the $110 cash, the selling shareholders would receive $5.00 a
share within five years. In actuality, the shareholders’ additional compensation
(known as the “stub”) was tied to the price to be received upon the planned sale of
Getty Oil’s insurance subsidiary, and the shareholders might receive more than $5.00
if a favorable sale could be arranged.76
After a lot of hassling, everyone signed off on a new version of the press
release.77 As finally disseminated, the press release said (in part):
LOS ANGELES – Getty Oil Company, The J. Paul Getty Museum and
Gordon P. Getty as trustee of the Sarah P. Getty Trust announced
today that they have agreed in principle with Pennzoil Company to a
merger of Getty Oil and a newly formed entity owned by Pennzoil
and the Trustee . . . .
***
The transaction is subject to execution of a definitive merger
agreement, approval by the stockholders of Getty Oil and completion
of various governmental filing and waiting-period requirements.78

The next morning, January 4, Geoff Boisi, the Goldman Sachs investment
banker who had represented Getty Oil (and refused to give a fairness opinion),
delivered his bill for the agreed minimum fee of $6 million.79

76

See id. at 196.

77

See COLL, supra note 3, at 328-29.

78

Texaco I, 729 S.W.2d at 789; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 198.

79

See COLL, supra note 3, at 332.
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About the same time, another investment banker was getting involved. Bruce
Wasserstein is one of the great merger and acquisition specialists. In addition to a
law degree from Harvard, Wasserstein holds an MBA from Harvard and an
advanced degree in economics from Cambridge.80 He is the author of a definitive
history of modern corporate deal-making, an 800-page tome titled Big Deal.81 When
Wasserstein heard that an “agreement in principle” had been reached, he understood
it, as most Wall Street people would have, as indicating that the parties were trying to
work out a deal and that because the Getty Oil board had decided to try to sell their
company, they would welcome higher offers. He set out to earn himself a fat fee by
finding someone who would make the highest of those higher offers.82
Wasserstein’s eagerness to become the guy who had pulled off the biggest
corporate acquisition in history (as well, perhaps, as being the guy who earned the
biggest investment banking fee in history) didn’t overcome his legal training, so he
made it his first order of business to make sure Pennzoil and the Getty interests
didn’t really have a binding contract. Marty Lipton, the lawyer who had played such
a big part in the negotiations, was a friend of his (networking pays), so Wasserstein
called Lipton and asked,
“Is there a deal here?”
“There is no deal yet,” Lipton replied.83
Then Wasserstein called another friend, Getty Oil director Larry Tisch, also a
veteran of many corporate takeovers.
“Is there a deal here?” Wasserstein asked.
“No, not yet,” was Tisch’s reply.
See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 201. A “Wunderkind,” Wasserstein had entered the University of
Michigan at 16 and Harvard Law School at 19. COLL, supra note 3, at 345.

80

Ironically, the Getty Oil takeover gets only two and half pages in this 800-page book.
WASSERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 189-93.
81

82 One writer calculated that the fee of approximately $10 million Wasserstein and his partner Joseph
Perella earned from the deal worked out to an hourly rate of $126,582. COLL, supra note 3, at 375.
Collectively, the investment bankers involved in the deal received fees totaling $47.1 million. See
PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 239.
83

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 202.
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“Is there going to be a tender offer? A merger? What is the form of it?”
“Frankly, I don’t know if it’s worked out yet.”84
Not realizing the significance that others would place on it, Tisch neglected to
mention the fact that he had toasted the deal with Gordon Getty and his wife.85
Boisi, Getty Oil’s investment banker, also called some potential bidders, trying
to get a higher price for his client.86 One bidder he called was Al DeCrane, president
of Texaco. Boisi told DeCrane: “There was a handshake on price, but there are a lot
of other issues and they’re working on a definitive agreement.”87 Although other oil
companies were also interested in Getty Oil, Texaco was the most logical buyer.
Texaco needed Getty’s oil reserves. For years, Texaco had been selling oil faster
than it could find new reserves to replace it. After a series of failed exploration
ventures, Texaco was now in a position where if it did not get new reserves it would
run out of oil in eight years.88
While this dealmaking was going on, the Pennzoil lawyers were working on the
documents, and it was turning out to be a bigger job than anticipated. This deal was
especially complex, not just because so much money was involved, but also because
there were four parties instead of the usual two. Pennzoil, Getty Oil, the trust, and
the museum all had concerns that had to be satisfied. Working out the terms of the
stub was especially complex. Pennzoil’s law firm, which was in charge of preparing
the first draft of the documents, flew in additional lawyers from Houston.89 At 8:30
p.m. on Wednesday, January 4, the Pennzoil legal team finally got the drafts to their
Id. Washington Post writer Steve Coll has a version of the conversation that is slightly different but
contains the same important phrases. COLL, supra note 3, at 347. Other players gave similar
assurances. When one investment banker representing Texaco asked Sid Petersen, chairman of the
board of Getty Oil whether Getty Oil had a firm contract with Pennzoil and the trust, he replied with
a phrase that would often be quoted during the course of the coming litigation: “We do not. The fat
lady has not yet sung.” Id. at 332.
84
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See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 327.
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COLL, supra note 3, at 332.
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See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 203.

See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 32, at 191 See also DELANEY, supra note 2, at 127-28 (discussing
Texaco’s problems with diminishing reserves).
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See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 204-05.
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Getty Oil counterparts, who had expected to have them twelve hours earlier.90 At
this point the Getty Oil lawyers had not only been waiting all day for the documents,
but they had also been up most of the previous two nights working on the deal.
They decided it was best to go home and get a good night’s sleep so they would be
fresh when they began their review of the documents.91
In the meantime, on the afternoon of January 4, Claire Getty, daughter of
Gordon’s deceased older brother George, obtained a restraining order from a
California court ordering Gordon to refrain from signing “any legally binding
documents” until a hearing was held the next day. Claire had long been concerned
about Gordon’s management of the trust, and she wanted time to study the Pennzoil
deal before allowing it to go forward.92
Also on the afternoon of January 4, John McKinley, the Chairman of Texaco,
called John Weinberg, Geoff Boisi’s boss at Goldman, Sachs (Getty Oil’s investment
bankers). Weinberg assured McKinley that Getty Oil was not bound and that it was
in fact seeking higher offers.93 Hearing that, McKinley began looking for an
investment banking firm he could hire to arrange a deal with Getty Oil. When his
first choice wasn’t available, McKinley hired Wasserstein’s firm, First Boston.
Wasserstein arrived at Texaco headquarters by chartered jet at four o’clock the next
morning.94 At about the same time, Marty Lipton arose early to begin reviewing the
draft agreement on behalf of the museum. Before the sun was up, Wasserstein had
called him to say he had a new deal in the works, one that would get the museum
more money than the Pennzoil deal.95
For their part, the Getty Oil lawyers spent the day of the 5th reviewing the draft
agreement and fielding calls from the Pennzoil lawyers, who were urging them to
hurry up. Lipton and his associate, Patricia Vlahkis, had also spent the day reviewing

90

See id. at 206.
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See id. at 208.
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See id. at 207.
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See id. at 209.
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See id. at 209-12.
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See id. at 212.
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the draft. Finding the agreement unacceptable as it stood, they drafted new
provisions adding protections for the museum.96
In the meantime, McKinley had called Lipton and Petersen, telling them that
Texaco was seriously interested and urging them not to commit to Pennzoil or to
anyone else.97 McKinley then convened a meeting of the Texaco board of directors,
which approved his proposal to make an offer to buy Getty Oil.98
Late in the afternoon of the 5th, the Los Angeles Superior Court held a hearing
on the temporary restraining order sought by Claire Getty. In the course of his
argument, the lawyer representing Gordon said some things that would come back
to haunt not only him and his client, but also Texaco, which would end up paying
for what he said:
“There is presently a transaction agreed upon among Getty Oil Company, the J.
Paul Getty Museum . . . the trustee . . . and Pennzoil Company.”
“This is an agreement which has been entered into after extremely careful
consideration.”99
That evening, the Pennzoil lawyers were hard at work with their Getty Oil
counterparts, negotiating the terms of the final documents. As the evening wore on,
the Getty Oil people began quietly leaving one by one. At one in the morning, the
Pennzoil lawyers realized that even though there were a few points left to be worked
out, the last of the Getty Oil lawyers had left the negotiating session.100 What the
Pennzoil lawyers didn’t realize was that their Getty Oil counterparts had left because
there was another deal in the works.
While this was going on, Texaco chairman John McKinley was meeting with
Gordon to make an offer for the trust’s shares. During the meeting, one of the
lawyers representing Gordon in the meeting took a phone call from one of the
96

Id. at 217-18.

97

See id. at 214-15.

98

The meeting lasted about three hours. McKinley left the boardroom at 4:50 PM. Id. at 216-17.
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Id. at 219-20 (emphasis in original).
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See id. at 222.
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lawyers representing Gordon in the California injunction proceeding. The caller was
reporting on the status of the California proceeding. He had just filed an affidavit in
which one of Gordon’s investment bankers, trying to show that the Pennzoil
transaction was a “done deal” and couldn’t be stopped by an injunction, had sworn
under penalty of perjury that the Getty Oil board had “approved a corporate
reorganization” and that the “principal terms of the transaction” were included in the
previous day’s press release.101 In spite of this, the lawyer representing Gordon in
the meeting advised Gordon in the presence of the Texaco negotiators that, the
letter Gordon had signed for Pennzoil notwithstanding, Gordon was free to sell the
trust’s shares to Texaco. The handwritten insert saying his obligations were “subject
only to my fiduciary obligations” gave him an out because he had a fiduciary
obligation to the other beneficiaries of the trust to try to get a higher price.102
With that out of the way there was still the issue of the price Texaco would pay.
Here, the negotiations bogged down because neither side would make the first offer.
To get things moving, one of the investment bankers tracked down Larry Tisch and
asked him to come over to help facilitate an agreement. Not only was Tisch one of
the most respected businessmen in America, he was also thought to be a friend of
Gordon’s.103 It was he who had drunk the toast with Gordon and Gordon’s wife to
celebrate the Pennzoil deal.
As Gordon and his advisors caucused separately, Lipton (who had also been
called in to help facilitate a deal) and Tisch told McKinley that Gordon was not in a
mood to bargain. If McKinley wanted a deal, he had to offer $125 a share.104 When
Gordon and McKinley next met, McKinley said that he had expected to offer
something in the neighborhood of $122, “[b]ut,” he said, smiling, “I have gotten
some other indications here that there is another price that would be more agreeable
to you, and I am prepared to offer – ” “I accept,” said Gordon before he finished.
Then Gordon added, “Oh! You’re supposed to give the price first!” Everybody in

101

Id. at 225.
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Id. at 226.

In actuality, Tisch had only met Gordon three times. COLL, supra note 3, at 365. As to Tisch being
a “friend” of Gordon’s, that was the subject of an interesting exchange at the trial. See infra text
accompanying note 153.
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the room laughed and Gordon said “I think we can probably do business, if the
courts okay it and the price is what I have heard.”105
Because Gordon was still under a temporary restraining order prohibiting him
from signing legally binding documents, Marty Lipton drafted the following letter:
I regret that an order of the Superior Court in California prevents the
trustee of the Sarah C. Getty Trust from entering into any legally
binding agreement in any way concerning the stock or assets of Getty
Oil Company. Therefore I as trustee cannot commit to sell the Getty
Oil Company shares held by me as trustee to Texaco pursuant to the
offer of $125 per share being made by Texaco to all shareholders of
Getty Oil Company. I believe that I have a fiduciary duty to seek to
accept the offer by Texaco. It is my intention to request the court to
lift the order. . . . As soon as I am able to do so, I intend to agree to
sell or tender the shares to Texaco. . . . I will request Getty Oil
Company to approve the Texaco offer . . . .106
Before he signed the letter, Gordon took the precaution of consulting yet
another lawyer. He had his advisors track down Moses Lasky, who had represented
the trust for many years and knew more about the trust than anyone else alive.
When Lasky was found, eating dinner in a Chinese restaurant, he said he had no
problems with the letter.107 Thus assured, Gordon signed the letter shortly after
midnight on January 6, 1984.108
Marty Lipton, ever the careful lawyer, told Texaco that his client (the museum)
would go along with the deal only if it received an indemnity against claims arising
out of the deal. What was more, Lipton didn’t want just an ordinary, garden-variety
indemnity. He wanted the indemnity to provide that on the museum’s behalf “no
representation is made with respect to . . . the Pennzoil agreement.” In other words,
Lipton, whose assertion to Wasserstein that the Pennzoil agreement was not binding
was what got Texaco involved in the first place, was now asking Texaco to agree (1)
105 PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 229. For a slightly different version of the exchange, see COLL, supra
note 3, at 366.
106
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that they had not relied on that assertion and (2) that if Lipton’s client were sued
because the Pennzoil agreement really was binding, Texaco would cover Lipton’s
client’s losses.109 Looked at in this way, Lipton’s stance seems overreaching in the
extreme. But Lipton had legitimate reasons for wanting such an agreement. His
client, the museum, was a charitable organization that didn’t want to get caught up in
business disputes. The museum’s president, Harold Williams, was the former head
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Williams didn’t want to get dragged
into corporate squabbles, and he certainly didn’t want the bad publicity that was
likely to result from getting dragged into those squabbles.110
At first, the Texaco representatives resisted giving the museum an indemnity,
but Lipton showed them the Pennzoil documents and gave them more assurances
that even if Pennzoil sued, it couldn’t win. The Texaco people gave in, relying not
only on Lipton’s expertise in mergers, but also on his reputation for wisdom and
integrity.111 When Gordon heard of this, he decided he wanted an indemnity as well.
And Texaco gave him one.112
To make sure they had a binding agreement that could not be undone the way
the Pennzoil deal had been, the Texaco lawyers worked through the night to draft a
definitive contract. At noon the next day, the Getty Oil board of directors met via a
hastily-arranged conference call and voted to “withdraw” the $112.50 counteroffer
they had made to Pennzoil and accept the $125.00 offer made by Texaco.113 When
Liedtke threatened a breach of contract suit, Getty Oil’s general counsel assured his
Texaco counterpart that it was “the most absurd thing I’ve ever heard.”114 To beat
Liedtke to the punch, Getty Oil’s lawyers filed a lawsuit in Delaware (where Getty
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Oil was incorporated) asking for a declaratory judgment that there was no binding
contract with Pennzoil.115
On January 10, Pennzoil filed its own lawsuit, also in Delaware, asking for
specific performance of the Getty Oil-Pennzoil contract.116 A few days later, the
Pennzoil lawyers learned of the indemnities that had been granted to Gordon and
the museum, and they amended their complaint to sue Texaco for the tort of
intentionally interfering with the Getty Oil-Pennzoil contract. The indemnities were,
they reasoned, a clear indication that Gordon and the museum representatives
thought there was a contract with Pennzoil.117
Another suit was filed in California, this one by some of the beneficiaries of the
trust.118 Texaco settled it by agreeing to raise the price it paid for the Getty Oil stock
to $128 a share. This cost Texaco an additional $240 million. Later, the law firm
representing the beneficiaries asked the court to approve a fee of $5 million, to be
paid by the trust, for the firm’s services in bumping up the price. 119
Back in Delaware, the chancery court denied Pennzoil’s request for a
preliminary injunction. The court did not decide the question of whether Texaco
was liable for interference with a contract among Pennzoil and the other parties—it
reserved that issue for trial.120 As things turned out, the Delaware court never got to
hold the trial.
Hugh Liedtke was a good friend of Joe Jamail, one of the great personal injury
lawyers of all time.121 Jamail had won more than forty verdicts or settlements in
Id. at 240. Delaware was chosen not only because it was the state in which Getty Oil was
incorporated, but also because the Delaware courts were known for their sophistication in corporate
transactions. COLL, supra note 3, at 373-74.
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Id. at 246. The beneficiaries, through their guardian ad litem, a former dean of the UCLA Law
School, sought to enjoin the sale of the trust’s stock to Texaco and force the trust to enter into a
transaction with Pennzoil. Id.
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COLL, supra note 3, at 384-85. According to Jamail, he and Liedtke had “traveled the world
together with our wives.” JAMAIL, supra note 2, at 138.
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excess of $1 million, more than anyone else in history.122 He was famous, not only
for his courtroom theatrics but also for his partying. He was a friend of Willie
Nelson, and it was said that Mr. Nelson’s song about “a good-hearted woman [i]n
love with a good-timin’ man” had been inspired by Jamail’s long-suffering wife.123 At
first, Jamail resisted Liedtke’s attempts to get him involved, but Jamail finally agreed
to take the case because Liedtke’s wife told him he should do it out of friendship.124
Nevertheless, there was a problem. Jamail’s strength was talking to juries, and the
Delaware Chancery Court did not have jury trials.125
A clever lawyer solved that problem. The court rules provided that the party
bringing a lawsuit could dismiss the suit at any time before an answer had been filed
and that such a dismissal would be without prejudice to later refiling the same suit.126
Normally, one of the first things a defendant’s lawyer does is file an answer, but
when the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction, as Pennzoil had done here, the
defendant’s first priority is to deal with the injunction. The answer gets put off until
later. When lawyers are litigating to stop a takeover, the answer usually never gets
filed. The goal is to stop the takeover, and all anybody cares about is whether the
preliminary injunction is granted. A preliminary injunction will normally kill a
takeover. When the court rules on the preliminary injunction, the matter is, for all
practical purposes, over. Nobody worries about the lawsuit any more.127 This case
was different, however. It didn’t go away when the preliminary injunction was
denied. Nevertheless, the lawyers representing Texaco in Delaware were in the habit
of not taking the time to file an answer, and they didn’t file an answer in this case.
This oversight became known as “the ten billion dollar boo-boo.”128

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 19. When he published his memoir in 2003, Mr. Jamail claimed to
have “served as lead counsel in over 200 personal injury cases where recovery was in excess of $1
million.” JAMAIL, supra note 2, dust jacket.
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One of the lawyers at Baker & Botts, the big Houston firm that had been
representing Pennzoil in both the transaction and the litigation, realized what an
opening Texaco had given them. Baker & Botts filed a dismissal in Delaware and 15
minutes later filed a complaint in Houston, where they had the opportunity to get
not only a jury trial, but the hometown advantage as well.129
The Pennzoil forces wasted no time in exploiting the hometown advantage.
Judge Anthony A. P. Farris was assigned to hear pretrial matters on the case, and two
days after the assignment, Joe Jamail contributed $10,000 to his reelection
campaign.130 Mr. Jamail, who was already a member of the steering committee for
the judge’s campaign, had previously contributed only $100.131 Moreover, the large
contribution raised eyebrows because Jamail was a liberal democrat and Farris a
conservative Republican.132
Texaco’s Houston law firm countered by associating as co-counsel on the case
another member of the judge’s reelection campaign committee, but the lawyer they
hired was a friend of Jamail, and when Jamail told him the case might destroy their
friendship, the lawyer quickly withdrew from the representation.133
When Richard Miller, Texaco’s Houston lawyer, found out about the $10,000
campaign contribution, he had researchers go through the campaign finance
disclosures of all the local judges. He found that for the period 1980 through 1984,
Jamail had contributed a total of $32,710 to nineteen judges. Of this, $10,000 had
gone to Judge Farris, and another $10,000 to an administrative judge who had
authority over Farris. Upon learning this, he filed a motion to have Judge Farris
removed from the case. An out-of-town judge was called in to hear the motion.134
This judge ruled that under the Texas constitution a judge could be removed from a
case only if he or she (1) had a direct legal interest in the case, (2) was related to a
129
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friend for work the friend had done for Jamail. JAMAIL, supra note 2, at 141. He also claims he wrote
the check before Judge Farris was assigned to the case. Id.
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party by blood or marriage, or (3) had previously provided legal services to a party.
The mere appearance of bias, or even bias itself, was not grounds for recusal.135
In the hearing on the recusal of Judge Farris, Mr. Jamail had argued that any
problems the campaign contributions might have caused were mitigated by the fact
that Judge Farris would not actually preside at the trial, but would only hear the
pretrial matters. Shortly thereafter, however, the court rules were changed. The
new rules provided that the judge who handled pretrial matters would now preside
over the trial as well. The change was made retroactive so that it applied to Pennzoil
v. Texaco.136
The trial lasted five and a half months and created 24,000 pages of transcript.137
(There were also fifteen thousand pages of transcripts of pretrial depositions in the
case.138) The work was so intense that Miller, Texaco’s lead counsel, moved out of
his home and into a hotel near the courthouse for four and a half months.139
Throughout the trial, Jamail and the Pennzoil team hammered away at a very simple
theme: The Getty people had made a promise and were honor-bound to keep it.
The Pennzoil legal team talked about “oil patch honor” and about multi-million
dollar deals made by oilmen on the strength of a handshake.140 They were able to get
the jury to ignore the niceties of contract law.141

135 See id. at 291. This was in keeping with settled Texas law. See Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (en banc). For a discussion of the problem of judges hearing cases involving
attorneys who contributed heavily to their election campaigns, see Stuart Banner, Disqualifying Elected
Judges From Cases Involving Campaign Contributions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1988).
136
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The Pennzoil team also played to regional bias.142 The bad guys were from New
York. Jamail made a point of always referring to Texaco as “New York Texaco,”
making the jurors remember that although the name of the company had originally
been “The Texas Company,” it had long ago changed its name and moved its
headquarters to New York. The Texaco people believe the Pennzoil team’s tactics
went beyond regionalism and began playing on anti-Semitism, as many of the people
representing Texaco, Getty Oil, the trust and the museum were Jewish.143
Shortly after Pennzoil finished its case in chief and Texaco started its defense,
Texaco ran into bad luck. Judge Farris learned that he had cancer and left the case to
seek treatment.144 He was replaced by a judge who had been a boyhood friend of
Mr. Jamail.145 By this time the trial had been running for months, and the jurors
were getting impatient. They were finding it hard to pay attention to the case, so Mr.
Miller made a strategic decision. To avoid alienating the jury even more, he decided
to cut his case down to the bare minimum. He decided against calling many of the
witnesses he had planned to call.146
One of the witnesses Miller did call, however, was Chauncey Medberry,
President of Bank of America. Mr. Medberry was the one Getty Oil director who
had voted against the Pennzoil deal. In rebuttal of the evidence about handshake
deals and oilpatch honor, Medberry testified that “there was no binding agreement
on anybody, as I look at it.”147 He went on to say, “‘You would not sell a ten-billiondollar corporation based on a discussion that takes place in the middle of the night.

142 “Drawing on the powerful, coded, century-old rhetoric of Southern and Western populism in
American politics, [the Pennzoil lawyers] talked in sinister tones about the concentrated power of
New York lawyers and investment bankers.” COLL, supra note 3, at 389.
143 See, e.g., PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 350-51 (problems of Getty Oil lawyer not testifying on Jewish
holiday; accusations that judge told Jewish joke).

See id. at 373-74. In his book, Washington Post writer Steve Coll says the cause of Judge Farris’s
leaving the case was a heart ailment. COLL, supra note 3, at 448. But Petzinger’s description is much
more extensive, so I think he is more likely to be correct. Judge Farris had had heart problems long
before the case began. See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 318.
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There would have to be a document with all the terms agreed upon, hammered out,
negotiated. That’s the way business is conducted in this country.’”148
Miller also called Lawrence Tisch, the chairman of Loew’s Corporation. Tisch
was one of the Getty Oil directors who had voted in favor of the Pennzoil deal. He
was nevertheless adamant that there was no contract. “I know what I voted on,” he
said.149 Jamail, however, was able to get some good testimony out of him on cross
examination. With respect to the fact that Getty Oil’s investment banker submitted
its bill on the day after the board vote, Jamail got Tisch, who had been involved in
many mergers and acquisitions (and who was at the time working on gaining control
of CBS150), to admit that investment bankers do not normally submit their bills until
the deal is done.151 Jamail also made a big thing of the champagne toast that Tisch
had drunk with Gordon and his wife. Tisch’s explanation that the toast was not
intended to celebrate the completion of a deal, but only “the acceptance of a price
that could lead to the agreement on a contract” came off as rather lame.152 Tisch’s
cross-examination also produced an exchange that captures much of Jamail’s
message to the Texas jury:
Jamail:

“You’re not friends with Gordon Getty?”

Tisch:

“No, sir.”

Jamail:

“Did Gordon Getty think you were his friend?”

Tisch:

“Define ‘friend’ and I’ll answer the question.”

Jamail:

“Sir, I can’t define the New York friendship.”153
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In the damages phase of the trial, Miller made what in retrospect turned out to
be another multi-billion dollar mistake. It might have been a good decision, based
on all that Miller knew at the time, but it turned out to be a bad one, just like calling
an opponent’s bluff in poker only to find he has that full house.
Pennzoil had made its argument for damages as follows: Getty Oil owned a
billion barrels of oil reserves. If Texaco had not interfered, Pennzoil would have
purchased Getty Oil (and its oil reserves) for $3.4 billion dollars. The average cost of
finding new oil reserves in the United States at the time was $10.87 per barrel. Thus,
to find a billion dollars worth of new oil would have cost Pennzoil $10.87 billion.
Pennzoil should therefore be entitled to the difference between the price it would
have had to pay to find a billion barrels of oil and the price it would have had to pay
for Getty Oil.154
While Pennzoil’s theory was simple and seemingly logical, it was totally bogus.
If Getty Oil was really that valuable, why was Texaco able to get it by paying only
10% more than Pennzoil was offering? Were all the large oil companies in the world
(or for that matter all the large companies and rich individuals who had the
wherewithal to put together a big deal) so stupid that they didn’t know how valuable
Getty was? Were they really so stupid they couldn’t read the reports and do the
math that the jury was being asked to do?155 The answer, of course, is that things
weren’t as simple as Pennzoil’s argument made out. As near as anyone could
3, at 271. The acknowledged inventor of the “power breakfast,” see PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 173,
“he was regarded as one of the shrewdest, most determined corporate executives in the country” and
had been on the cover of Time magazine. COLL, supra note 3, at 271.
154

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 321.

The U.S. District Court embraced this reasoning when Texaco had the enforcement of the
judgment enjoined. The court said, “The best indication of the value of anything, including the stock
of an oil company, is usually an arm’s length sale between adequately informed parties, neither under
any compulsion to buy or sell; indeed, that is the traditional definition of market value.” Texaco, Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). On this basis, the court concluded that it was
highly likely the damages would be reduced on appeal. Id.
155

Commentators have concurred. E.g., DELANEY, supra note 2, at 133 (calling Pennzoil’s damage
theory “a strange way to calculate the damages” and citing other critical commentary).
In its post-trial brief, Texaco tried to hoist Pennzoil with its own petard, claiming that Pennzoil
had attempted to take unfair advantage of the Getty Oil shareholders by paying them only $2.6 billion
for assets which, according to Pennzoil’s evidence, were worth $10.9 billion. Baron & Baron, supra
note 47, at 258.
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determine, the value of Getty Oil was very close to the price that Texaco had paid
for it. Nevertheless, Miller decided not to put on witnesses to rebut Pennzoil’s
damages evidence.156
There was a good reason for not putting on evidence as to damages. Many of
the best trial lawyers believe that when the defense puts on evidence as to damages,
it lends credibility to the plaintiff’s case, if not admitting that there is liability, at least
admitting that the plaintiff has made a reasonable case for liability. Miller was a
proponent of this theory, and it had served him well on many occasions.157 Even so,
Miller did not make the decision lightly. He had engaged expert witnesses on
damages, prepared them, and even flown them to Houston so that they would be
ready if he chose to use them.158 But when he was finished with his other witnesses,
he decided to roll the dice and not put on his evidence concerning damages.159
Although the judge admitted that he didn’t know New York contract law, he
refused to allow the parties to submit briefs on the subject. Instead, he told the
parties to give him copies of the cases on which they relied. When both parties gave
him a large stack of cases, he decided not to read them all, but instead to rely on the
three cases that both sides had included in their submissions.160 Over the objection
of Texaco’s lawyers, the judge gave the jury a charge that tracked almost verbatim
the language proposed by Pennzoil.
Among other things, it used the word
“agreement” constantly and never contained the word “contract,” implying that to
find Texaco liable, all the jury had to decide was that Pennzoil had an “agreement”
with the Getty interests, rather than a formal contract.161
In its deliberations, one individual dominated the jury, a left-wing activist who
had managed bands, counseled draft dodgers, and helped publish an underground

156

See COLL, supra note 3, at 456.

157

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 384-85.

158

See id. at 385.

159 Jamail refers to this as “a judgment call that would still be debated years later.” JAMAIL, supra note
2, at 152.
160

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 390-91.

161

See id. at 391; COLL, supra note 3, at 453-55.
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newspaper.162 With his guidance, and angry at what it saw as double-dealing by
Marty Lipton and the investment bankers involved in the deal, the jury returned a
verdict awarding Pennzoil $7.53 billion in compensatory damages plus $3 billion in
punitive damages.163 The Wall Street Journal referred to it as “the Texas Common
Law Massacre.”164
After the verdict was in, the legal maneuvering continued. Under Texas law, the
judgment gave Pennzoil the right to obtain a lien on any of Texaco’s real property in
the state, from gas stations to refineries, simply by recording an abstract of the
judgment in the real property records of the county where the property was
located.165 It also allowed Pennzoil to obtain a writ of execution ordering state
officials to seize Texaco property and sell it in order to satisfy the judgment.166 To
avoid this, Texaco would have to “fil[e] a good and sufficient bond to be approved
by the clerk” in “at least the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs.”167
No company was willing to issue a bond for eleven billion dollars, so the Texaco
legal team tried an end run around the Texas courts. Engaging in their own form of
hometown justice, they went to the United States District Court in White Plains,
N.Y., where Texaco had its headquarters and where the judge just happened to be a
friend of one of Texaco’s New York lawyers. They convinced the judge to enjoin
the enforcement of the Texas judgment on the ground that the bond requirement
denied Texaco due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 20, 400-08. In a calculated understatement, Jamail calls him “one
of the more active jurors.” JAMAIL, supra note 2, at 157.
162

163

See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 400-09.

Id. at 437. Arthur Liman attributes this to the efforts of Texaco’s public relations firm, headed by
Linda Robinson, wife of American Express CEO James Robinson III. LIMAN, supra note 34, at 248.
A less biased writer notes that Eastern papers tended to favor Texaco, whereas Texas papers favored
Pennzoil, particularly when Texaco attacked the Texas judicial system. See COLL, supra note 3, at 47475.
164

165

See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 4 (1987).

166

See id. at 4-5.

167 Id. at 5. Lest anyone believe that Pennzoil would not actually seize Texaco’s property, there was a
precedent. When Sears had delayed in posting an appeal bond after Jamail had won a products
liability case against it, Jamail had levied execution on a Sears store in downtown Houston. Sears
immediately dropped its appeal and paid the judgment in full. See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 413-14.
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States Constitution.168 Pennzoil appealed the decision to the Second Circuit. The
Second Circuit upheld the district court169 in spite of what many legal scholars
thought was a great deal of contrary precedent.170 Pennzoil appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
After the case had been argued to the Supreme Court, but before the Court had
rendered its decision, the Texas Court of Appeals issued its opinion upholding the
trial court’s verdict in favor of Pennzoil, but reducing the punitive damages by $2
billion.171
While Texaco was fighting in the courts, there had been a lot going on outside
the judicial system. Texaco’s bankers took steps to make sure they were protected in
the event Texaco went broke.172 They put restrictions on the way Texaco could
move money among its accounts, and they put new minimum balance requirements
on existing accounts.173 Texaco found it more difficult to borrow the money it
needed for its day-to-day operations, even when it was willing to put up good
collateral. Some other oil companies refused to do business with Texaco unless it
paid cash in advance. These precautions seem to have been unnecessary. It could be
argued that Texaco was still a good credit risk because it had a book value (assets less
liabilities) of at least $13 billion,174 a liquidation value of $22 to $26 billion,175and
annual revenues of $32 billion.176 But there may have been other factors at work.
When Texaco was doing well, it had played hardball with its lenders as well as with

168

Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

169

Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir. 1986).

170

See DELANEY, supra note 2, at 138.

171

Texaco I, 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).

Mr. Jamail, although perhaps not an unbiased observer, says that the odds of Texaco becoming
insolvent were “about the same as those of eradicating social diseases.” JAMAIL, supra note 2, at 137.

172

173 See DELANEY, supra note 2, at 136; see also PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 418-19 (describing actions
of other creditors).
174

See DELANEY, supra note 2, at 146.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 135
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other oil companies.177 Now that it was in trouble, these lenders and oil companies
may have been looking to exact a little revenge. At a minimum, they were unwilling
to take any risk to do a favor for someone who had refused to do favors for them.
The New York Times quoted a New York banker as saying, “If it were Exxon or
Mobil, all the big banks would rally around it.”178
There had also been continuing settlement negotiations between Texaco and
Pennzoil, including talks of a merger between Pennzoil and Texaco, with Liedtke
getting a top job in the combined company.179 These discussions broke off when
Texaco made an offer far less generous than Liedtke had expected.180 Settlement was
made more difficult by a worldwide drop in oil prices, which made Texaco’s
settlement proposals less attractive.181
On April 6, 1987, the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion,
reversing the lower federal courts.182 Now Texaco was required to post the bond.
Moreover, its lenders came down even harder on it. Many had provisions in their
loan agreements allowing them to refuse to make additional loans (and even to insist
on immediate repayment of outstanding loans) if there was “a material adverse
change” in Texaco’s financial position. At this point, many of the lenders invoked
these clauses.183
Six days after the Supreme Court decision, Texaco reacted by filing a Chapter 11
bankruptcy, the largest bankruptcy in history.184 A few days after it filed the Chapter
Id. at 136-37; see also COLL, supra note 3, at 337 (describing Texaco as “an unusually closed and
autocratic company, dogged in the oil patch by a reputation for imperiousness, parsimony, and
reactionary management”).
177

178

See DELANEY, supra note 2, at 137.

179

See COLL, supra note 3, at 474.

180

Id.

Id. One of the most intriguing of these proposals would have allowed Pennzoil to obtain the
three-sevenths of the Getty gas and oil reserves that Pennzoil would have had if the original deal had
gone through. The drop in oil prices meant that these reserves were much less valuable to Pennzoil
or to anyone else. PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 431.
181

182

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987).

183

See DELANEY, supra note 2, at 143.

184

Id. at 144.
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11, Texaco offered to pay Pennzoil $2 billion to settle the case.185 Pennzoil, which
now realized that the case might drag on for several years and that it would not get
paid until the case was over, reduced its settlement demand. But the parties were still
a few billion dollars apart.186 The stalemate continued until November, when
financier Carl Icahn acquired a large block of Texaco stock and made himself
Texaco’s largest single shareholder.187 Icahn pushed for a settlement, and the
bankruptcy judge announced that if Pennzoil, Texaco’s other creditors, and Texaco’s
shareholders agreed to a plan of reorganization (which would necessarily include a
settlement of the Pennzoil claim), he would consider the plan even if it wasn’t
approved by Texaco’s management.188 After some hard negotiating, these groups
agreed to settle the case for $3 billion, and Texaco’s management reluctantly
acquiesced.189
Jamail never disclosed how much he received from his contingency fee
agreement. One writer says it was $600 million;190 another says it was only $300
million.191
II. Lessons from the Case
There are a number of lessons that we can learn from the case. With the benefit
of hindsight, we can see what the lawyers who put these deals together did right and
what they did wrong.
185

Id. at 149

186

Id.

187

Id. at 150.

188

Id. at 151.

189 Id. at 152. In his memoir, Arthur Liman claims that the settlement was finally negotiated by Joe
Jamail and Carl Icahn, a corporate raider who held a large block of Texaco stock, after Liman had
gotten the two men together and they had engaged in a three-hour drinking bout. LIMAN, supra note
34, at 248. Jamail, who is not one to downplay his own importance (or his drinking), merely says they
started with beer at 11 a.m. and that “[s]everal people helped work out a proposal for a three-billiondollar settlement.” JAMAIL, supra note 2, at 167.

Harold A. Segall, An Executive’s Lesson in the Law From a Typical Business Encounter, 23 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 257, 260 n.18 (1996).
190

Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of
the Plaintiffs’ Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 221 (2001).
191
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Lesson 1: Make it clear whether you have a contract.
Businesspeople love to enter into informal agreements that may or may not be
binding contracts.192 As in the Pennzoil-Texaco situation, these agreements to agree
often lead to litigation. Even more often, they lead to extorted settlements, where
one party who is willing to claim there is a contract and threaten litigation can get
money out of another party who wants to avoid litigation.193 To avoid questions, if a
binding agreement is intended, this intention should be clearly stated; likewise, if the
parties do not intend to be bound by their agreement, the agreement should state
even more clearly that it creates no legally enforceable obligations.194 To make sure
that no argument can be made that negotiations have created a binding contract
before the lawyers get all the details worked out, careful lawyers will often have the
parties execute a document containing language like this:
Although the parties may exchange proposals (written or oral), term
sheets, draft agreements or other materials, neither party will have
any obligations or liability to the other party unless and until both
parties’ authorized representatives sign definitive written agreements.
Exchanged terms are non-binding to the extent they are not included
in such definitive written agreements. Either party can end these
discussions at any time, for any reason (or for no reason at all), and
without liability to the other party. Each party remains free to
negotiate and to enter into contracts with others.195
Lesson 2: Every time you draft a contract, consider whether an arbitration
clause, choice-of-forum clause, or jury waiver would benefit your client.
An arbitration clause wouldn’t have helped Texaco because Texaco wasn’t a
party to the contract with Pennzoil. But in most business deals, you’re worried
See Robert M. Lloyd, Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts Course, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 282 (2004).
192

193

Id. at 283.

For a more extensive discussion, see GEORGE W. KUNEY, THE ELEMENTS
DRAFTING 136 (2003).
194

OF

CONTRACT

Cases in which language like this helped a party avoid a major liability include S. Union Co. v. S.W.
Gas Corp., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1044-45 (D. Ariz. 2002); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Taco Tico
Acquisition Corp., 454 S.E.2d 789, 790-91 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).

195
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primarily about litigation with the other parties to the contract. Here, arbitration has
a number of advantages. First, you can provide that the arbitrators will be persons
with extensive experience in transactions like those in question. Even if you don’t,
the arbitrators chosen will generally be sophisticated people—businesspeople,
lawyers, academics with a practical bent, former judges. Arbitrators are less likely to
favor the home team, to be swayed by the theatrics of a Joe Jamail, or to award
outrageous verdicts. But there are dangers in arbitration, some of which can be
minimized with a carefully drafted arbitration clause, others of which cannot.196
Therefore, you should never unthinkingly add an arbitration clause to your
documents (or, even worse, unthinkingly agree to the other side’s arbitration clause).
You need to consider carefully whether arbitration is the best thing for this client in
this transaction.
If arbitration isn’t appropriate (or if it isn’t agreeable to the other side), a clause
in which all parties waive their right to a jury trial will often be useful. While Texaco
seems to have suffered some “home cookin’” at the hands of the Texas judges, most
litigators think that judges are less likely to be biased than jurors and less likely to
award outrageously generous damages.
You can also include a choice-of-forum clause providing that all disputes arising
out of the contract will be settled in a certain court or courts. These not only give
your client protection against bias, but they reduce travel costs and save the expense
of hiring local counsel.
Lesson 3: Think of the way things will look in litigation.
There are a lot of things that make sense from a business standpoint but will
look bad if the case ever goes to litigation. The indemnity Texaco gave the museum
and the trust is a great example. As part of a business deal, it made sense.197 But
when it came out in litigation, the indemnity put Marty Lipton in the position where

For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration, see Steven W. Sanford, A Trial
Lawyer’s View of Sales Documents in WHY DIDN’T THE COURT ENFORCE YOUR AGREEMENT? A
LITIGATOR’S ADVICE TO ATTORNEYS DRAFTING TRANSACTIONAL DOCUMENTS (2002).
196

197

See supra text accompanying note 109-110.
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he had to say, in effect: “I was sure there was no contract, but I wanted an indemnity
just in case there was.”198
Any time you say or write something that isn’t protected by privilege, you have
to think of how it might be used against you or your client. For example, in
Penthouse International, Ltd. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n,199 a
federal district court entered a judgment for $135 million dollars against a bank and
its law firm when a deal fell apart.200 The district judge, who tried the case without a
jury, believed that the bank’s lawyer had raised bogus objections to loan documents
in order to kill a deal because his client had committed to a loan in excess of its legal
lending limit and was unable to find other lenders to participate in the deal.201 The
bank lawyer’s bullying and intimidating style as well as his characterization of loan
documents prepared by another lender as “idiotic” helped the court conclude that
the bank had hired the lawyer to kill the deal.202 The judgment was reversed on
appeal.203 The Second Circuit held that it wasn’t the bank’s lawyer, but sloppy and
unprofessional work on the part of the other parties that had killed the deal.204 Still,
the case cost a lot of money and a lot of sleepless nights, all of which might have
been avoided if the lawyer had used a little more tact and circumspection.205

198 Alternatively, he could have said: “I knew there wasn’t a contract, but I wanted an indemnity just in
case some dumb jury got it wrong.” But there would have been certain problems with saying it that
way.
199

665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev’d, 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988).

200

See id. at 301, 312.

201

See id. at 307-08.

See id. at 307. The bank’s case was not helped by testimony that during the negotiations the bank’s
chairman had responded to accusations that the bank was not acting in good faith by saying, “Screw
good faith. We’re going to do it our way because we’re the co-leader.” Id. at 306.

202

203

Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Queen City Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 855 F.2d 963, 987 (2d Cir. 1988).

Among other things, the mortgage that the other lender planned to use for a $97 million dollar
loan was a pre-printed “plain language” form that bore the heading: “Consult your lawyer before
signing this mortgage – it has important legal consequences.” Id. at 969.

204

205 Interestingly, Arthur Liman, who had represented Pennzoil in the negotiations to buy Getty Oil,
argued the bank’s appeal to the Second Circuit. See id. at 964. It was he who had remembered the
handshakes that those on the other side did not. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
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Clients, especially, need to be warned that they’re writing for posterity. The Texaco
people discovered this when the notes they took during meetings were used against
them. The jury focused on these notes during its deliberations,206 and the Texas
Court of Appeals used the notes to support its conclusion that Texaco knew there
was a contract in force when it came into the deal.207 The court said, “Other Texaco
notes admitted into evidence implied that Texaco believed it had ‘24 hours’ to ‘stop
the train’ and ‘take care of Liedtke [Pennzoil’s CEO]’.”208
Cases are legion in which notes, e-mails, internal memos, and the like were
turned against their writers.209 The blow that finally killed the accounting firm of
Arthur Anderson and Company was a criminal charge that it had destroyed such
documents to keep them from being used in the Enron litigation.210
Lesson 4: You probably don’t know all of the facts.
Litigators learn early in their careers that they don’t know all the facts. The
client comes in, tells you the facts, and it sounds like a slam-dunk case. Then as you
review the client’s files, take discovery, and engage in settlement negotiations, you
learn one bad fact after another. Pretty soon you’re kicking yourself for ever taking
the case. After this happens a few times, you become much more careful about the
cases you take.
Pennzoil shows that lawyers who do deals have to have the same wariness. If
the lawyers who said there was no contract between Pennzoil and the Getty interests
had known all the facts, they wouldn’t have been so confident in their assertions.
Even without that knowledge, they probably would have chosen their words a lot
more carefully if they had stopped for a minute to think of how little they really
knew.
206 See

PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 403.

207 See

Texaco I, 729 S.W.2d 768, at 801 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).

Id.; LIMAN, supra note 34, at 244. One writer described these notes as “the most powerful” of the
documents that Pennzoil found during discovery. COLL, supra note 3, at 418. See also PETZINGER,
supra note 3, at 250 (describing the delight of the Pennzoil lawyers when they discovered the notes).
208

See, e.g., State Nat’l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(notes taken by bank officers during meetings key to upholding $18 million judgment against banks).

209

See, e.g., KC Goyer, Nancy Temple’s Duty: Professional Responsibility and the Arthur Andersen Verdict, 18
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 261-62 (2004).
210
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Sometimes you can’t trust what your clients tell you, even when you have no
doubts about their basic honesty. Memory plays tricks on a person, especially when
pride and money are at stake. Arthur Liman, a lawyer of unquestioned integrity,
remembered shaking hands with a number of people after the Pennzoil board voted.
The people on the other side of those handshakes did not recall them.211 Also,
clients will neglect to tell you things because they don’t think they’re important.
Larry Tisch, a very sophisticated business executive with nothing to hide, saw no
reason to tell Bruce Wasserstein about the champagne toast that was to play such a
big part in Pennzoil’s case.212
If this weren’t enough, there’s always the problem that people in an organization
don’t know everything their colleagues are doing. While the trust’s representatives
were telling Texaco one thing, its California lawyers were telling the court out there
something else.213
Lesson 5: You can’t always foresee the way things will come back to bite you,
but you should at least try.
It’s just the nature of things that statements businesspeople and lawyers make in
one stage of the affair come back to bite them in a later stage. The seller talks about
what a great deal the buyer is getting. This is used against the seller to show breach
of warranty or to enhance damages. Similarly, things you say in one stage of a
lawsuit can often be used against you in another stage or in a different lawsuit. Most
of the time there is nothing you can do about this. Larry Tisch couldn’t have been
expected to know what effect his champagne toast with the Gettys would have. The
lawyer who argued against the restraining order on Gordon’s behalf couldn’t know
that saying the deal had been given “extremely careful consideration” would
ultimately result in a major embarrassment to his client. But you have to understand
that every time you try to sound like a confident advocate instead of a mealymouthed office lawyer, you’re taking a chance that sometime, somewhere, some
smooth-talking lawyer for a greedy plaintiff is going to turn those words against you
as he tries to extract a big settlement from your client.214
211 See

supra text accompanying notes 71-72.

212 See

supra text accompanying notes 75, 85, 152.

213 See

supra text accompanying notes 101-02.

And if you’re sure you can’t be outsmarted by a trial lawyer, consider Marty Lipton. As a
dealmaker, no one is better. One writer called him “the most respected and feared attorney on Wall

214
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Lesson 6: Maintain good personal relationships.
Too often, businesspeople litigate when the rationality they supposedly pride
themselves on would dictate otherwise. One of your jobs as a lawyer is to make your
client see the other person’s point of view without having the client wonder who’s
side you’re really on.
You’ll also need to keep your client from provoking the other side unnecessarily.
Apologies and a settlement offer large enough that it didn’t insult Hugh Liedtke
might well have kept Pennzoil from suing Texaco. Similarly, the fact that New
Yorkers were making fun of Baker & Botts for their handling of the Getty/Pennzoil
deal may have made the Baker & Botts lawyers more willing to counsel litigation and
more aggressive when they got into the litigation.215 Had the Texaco people realized
this earlier, they probably could have done something to make the Baker and Botts
lawyers look better and feel better.
Lesson 7: Networking pays—most of the time.
When the verdict came in, Marty Lipton and Bruce Wasserstein probably
wished they hadn’t been such good friends.216 But Hugh Liedtke’s long-time
friendship with Joe Jamail certainty paid off for him. Mr. Jamail made out pretty
well, too. Being good friends with the judges didn’t hurt Mr. Jamail either.

Street.” COLL, supra note 3, at 442. But everyone agrees that he made a bad impression on the Texas
jury. See, e.g., COLL, supra note 3, at 443-47, 449-50; PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 405, 407-08, 423.
Jamail points out how he deliberately chose jurors who would be offended by the very traits that
made Lipton a good transactional lawyer. JAMAIL, supra note 2, at 142. After devoting three pages of
his book to detailing how he had “fun” working over Marty Lipton (“nicking him, nailing him”),
Jamail concludes: “But, respectfully, I must say that Marty Lipton… is the best acquisition lawyer in
America.” JAMAIL, supra note 2, at 155.
Some New York lawyers claimed that the reason Texaco had been able to buy Getty Oil was that
the Houston lawyers of Baker & Botts were slow in producing the Pennzoil merger documents
because they lacked the merger expertise of the New York firms. See PETZINGER, supra note 3, at 253.

215

216

See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
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Lesson 8: What goes around comes around.
It’s a cliché, but (to paraphrase Henry Kissinger) even clichés have some truth in
them.217 Throughout the case Texaco paid for its history of arrogance, hard
bargaining, and refusing to follow the conventions of the oil business. If Hugh
Liedtke had not had a longstanding dislike for Texaco, he might not have filed the
lawsuit in the first place. If Texaco had been better liked in the business community,
it might have found more favorable witnesses to explain to the jury how business is
really done. If Texaco hadn’t had a history of squeezing its bankers, the bankers
would have found a way to help it post the bond.
Lesson 9: You can’t predict the outcome of litigation.
Even after the Pennzoil-Texaco lawsuit was moved to Houston, Texaco’s
lawyers, some of the best in the world, told their client it would win easily.218 All
through the course of the litigation, there were decisions or chance events, which, if
they had gone the other way, might have changed the outcome. If the answer had
been filed in Delaware, . . . if the jury’s one Jewish member hadn’t been unable to
continue, making way for the alternate who came to dominate the jury, . . . if the
court rules hadn’t been changed, . . . if Judge Farris hadn’t developed cancer, . . . . If,
if, if.
Once you get beyond the realm of summary judgment, it really does become a
crapshoot, which is one more reason you have to try to structure the deal so that
your client can get a summary judgment.
Lesson 10: Get some litigation experience.
The best way to learn to see how your documents and deals will look in
litigation is to do some litigating. Hugh Liedtke, a law school graduate himself, may
have had this in mind when he brought in Arthur Liman to assist in the negotiations

217 Henry Kissinger, secretary of state under Richard Nixon, said of his famously-paranoid boss,
“Even a paranoid has some real enemies.” JAMES B. SIMPSON, SIMPSON’S CONTEMPORARY
QUOTATIONS 211 (1988).
218 See COLL, supra note 3, at 398. Texaco’s trial counsel, a man with years of experience litigating
before Texas juries, said that the worst case scenario was a verdict of $250-500 million against Texaco.
Id. at 408.
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for the Getty Oil takeover. Liman was a litigator, not a corporate lawyer, but Liedtke
had Liman aboard for “strategic counseling.”219
Law firms used to cross-train their lawyers, so the people who made the deals
would know what their deals would look like in court and the litigators would know
what to look for when they started digging into deals that had gone bad. That’s not
done much anymore. Associates get paid so much that firms can’t afford the billable
hours that always need to be written off when an associate is learning a new field.
There are still ways to get litigation experience though. Sometimes a litigation
team needs a transactional lawyer for her technical expertise. Try to get these
assignments. Then, if you can do it without upsetting the people you normally work
with, try to expand your role in the litigation. Pro bono work is another way to get
litigation experience. Even a little landlord-tenant case gives you useful insights.

219 See

LIMAN, supra note 34, at 239-41.

